The peripheral crisis: challenges and opportunities

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
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
Summary

- The peripherals' lost decade
- Debt: is this time different?
- How do we try to make it different?
- Is it working? Positive signs from exports but negative signs from unemployment
- What else can we do? Shrinking the public sector? What about European banks?
- Conclusions

GDP PER CAPITA Peripherals' lost decade



DEBT-GDP Let's hope 'this time is different'



How do we try to make it different?

- Institutional framework
- Fiscal policy
- Portfolio decisions

Institutional framework: public budgets

- Good progress on the sense of European identity
 - In February 2010 the initial discussion was about a series of bilateral operations to help Greece
 - In 2013 for the first time national budgets will have to be presented and discussed at the European level
- It would be useful to coordinate fiscal policies, but that would call for decisions that depend on the state of the economies and common objectives
 - However, all the States are cutting the deficit at the same time

Institutional framework: banks

- Very ambitious targets on banking regulation, with unclear implications (esp. at a time of unconventional policies) related to the ECB jointly supervising banks and deciding monetary policy
- Still unclear how to deal with systemic financial institutions and how to build a system of European deposit insurance that is large enough
- Bail-in of subordinated and senior bond-holders may have serious implications on banks' cost of funding

Fiscal policy

- Initial response: austerity, austerity, austerity
- 2013 common wisdom: no growth with too much austerity
- Where did the change come from?
 - Studying Greece and Italy (which has maintained fiscal discipline for ten years with negative gowth)
 - The new IMF normal: the income multiplier is around one (maybe more)
- How would a country apply for OMT? Without austerity plans?

Portfolio decisions: holdings of government bonds, July 2010

Bonds:	Greek	Irish Ita	alian Port	tuguese S	Spanish
Banks					
Greece	261.37%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Ireland	0.19%	29.60%	3.43%	1.22%	1.85%
Italy	1.31%	0.03%	121.51%	0.09%	1.51%
Portugal	10.74%	2.99%	0.75%	28.24%	0.00%
Spain	0.53%	0.00%	2.54%	2.54 1	06.59%
Non-GIIPS	2.58%	0.82%	4.16%	0.70%	0.91%

Source: EBA, Bankscope

Portfolio decisions: holdings of government bonds, October 2012

 Bonds 	Greek	Irish It	alian Portu	uguese Sp	anish
Banks					
Greece	1225.46%	0.00%	12.20%	0.00%	0.00%
Ireland	0.00%	48.55%	0.94%	0.07%	0.00%
Italy	0.00%	0.01%	218.37%	0.06%	3.31%
Portuga	1.21%	5.00%	1.22%	121.9%	0.09%
Spain	0.00%	0.00%	2.83%	1.89%	182.47%
Non-GIIP	S 0.00%	0.03%	0.94%	0.00%	0.00%

Source: EBA, Bankscope

Portfolio decisions


- Fragmentation of capital markets is not a result of the crisis, we had a strong domestic bias also before the crisis
- Non-GIIPS banks overall have not contributed to stabilization of financial markets
- Pro-cyclical portfolio choices not due to Basle regulation but to tactical allocation
- Pro-cyclical portfolio choices by professional investors do not help the real economy but may help imposing discipline on borrowers

IS IT WORKING?

Is it working? To some, still a second derivative relief...

- Return to growth after 18 months: 0.3% for the eurozone
- Portugal ended recession with growth of 1.1% (-2% yoy) thanks to 6% increase in export and improvement in investment
- Italy and Spain are still in recession
- Eurozone industrial production grew in June at its fastest rate in three years, mainly thanks to Germany; Ireland and Greece also grew (8.7% and 2.5%) but Spain and Portugal contracted 0.5% and 2.8%


CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS: moving in the right direction



Crucial questions

- Is this the result of strict austerity of the 2011-2013 or of the moderation of austerity of the last two quarters? Implications on future actions are completely different
- Can we expect exports to increase fast enough to increase demand even when public demand is shrinking?
 - Okun's law: productivity is cyclical

UNEMPLOYMENT: long term (maybe irreversible) damage to social capital and productivity




Unemployment


- Youth unemployment is very large in Italy and Spain
- This has long lasting negative consequences: some people never learn how to work
- In a very competitive world, there is a risk of irreversible transfer of jobs abroad. If jobs go abroad, then the country is left without the possibility to repay the debt

WHAT ELSE CAN WE DO?

PRIMARY PUBLIC SURPLUS: trying hard to make it different



NON-INTEREST GOV. EXP. Somewhere not moving fast enough



Shrinking the public sector

- It must be done, but there is a contractionary impact with a unitary multiplier
- To avoid vicious curcles, the only moves can be soft and depend on other sources of growth

Banks: lending

- Lending is still tight and interest rates very fragmented, with huge differentials between core and periphery
- Eurozone banks have shrunk their assets by almost 3 tn in the last year, and some forecast there will be more downsizing (interesting implications for financial intermediaries)

Banks: the future

- Redesigning banking:
 - Basel III,
 - Asset Quality Review,
 - Separation between investment banks and commercial banks,
 - Stress tests,
 - Bonds bail-in
 - Leverage rather than Equity/RWA
- Will a more capitalized European banking system be a crucial factor for growth? You can force banks to raise capital, but not to lend (remember UK's funding for lending)
- In order to regulate a banking sector, you need one that is alive, and it can be alive if it is profitable

CONCLUSIONS



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